Kingsbury and Scanzoni's (1993) outline of structural functionalism is a presentation of the current (early 1990s) status of the theory. They acknowledge the need to go beyond many of the blind spots of Parsons to construct a theory more reflective of the complexity of family phenomena by including insights, especially, from conflict theory. They also add that there is a need to transcend the conservative bias and the homoeostatic vision of family phenomena. Pittman (1993), in an application reflection on the Kingsbury and Scanzoni article, notes that there is empirical evidence for the applicability of the theory for therapists and creators of public policy. However, he argues that even though there has been a resurgence of functional thinking in the 1980s (and, I might add, the 1990s), it has not reached the family field as yet. It to this lacuna that this paper is addressed.
I am trying to create a conceptual framework of the family that is theoretically synthetic in nature, is sociological in breadth, and is grounded empirically. I entitle this theory "Neofunctionalism Plus" because it is a review the literature that reconstructs Parsons in the name of Neofunctionalism, attempts to modify Neofunctionalism itself by going beyond it while being true to its core propositions and then translates it into a family framework. This paper will contribute to the extension of family theory that builds upon, especially, what has been named by Alexander (1988) as the New Theoretical Movement in sociology.
The work of the sociological theorist Jeffrey Alexander will play a key role in this theory construction. Alexander (1988 and, with Colomy, 1990) considers the sociological enterprise to be divided into a generalized discourse and a research program. The former, in the parameter of theoretical logic, is located in an metaphysical environmental on one end of a continuum that is traced to another end, the empirical environment (Alexander, 1982). As illustrated in Figure 1,
under the title of generalized discourse, I shall outline a sociological discourse that will be followed, in turn, by a short review of Parson's relevant work; Neofunctionalism, which I term, phase one; Neofunctionalism, phase two; Neofunctionalism plus, and, then, all these being translated to the family. The research program will be links of central concepts kept from the legacies of Parsons, neofunctionalism phase one and two and new additions under the rubric of neofunctionalism plus.
Neofunctionalism phase one and two will rely on Alexander's twenty year plus history of constructing neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalism Plus consists of recent updates by Alexander (1998) and adds concepts and propositions from other sociological theories, not, as yet, part of neofunctionalism, relevant to the family.
I type neofunctionalism phase one as the initial work of Alexander (1985) as presented in a volume dedicated to the emergent theory. According to Alexander, the best in Parsons (1951) is his consideration of society as a system wherein all the elements form a pattern that can be differentiated from some other surrounding environment. In addition, Alexander (1985) thinks, is his concentration on action as well as function. Integration of these functional parts to the whole should not be considered to be an accomplished fact but a possibility. He, especially, considers Parsons' distinctions of the personality system, the cultural system and the social system to be central to any adequate sociological theory. Beyond that, Parson's contribution to social differentiation theory, his attempt to synthesise the 19th century classical traditions of Durkheim and Weber, and the importance of socialization is all part of a lasting legacy. Alexander continues with several critiques of Parsons (first outlined in Volume Four of his Theoretical Logic in Sociology, 1983) and concludes this article by including insights from conflict and interactionist theories which become important corner stones to the first phase of neofunctionalism.
A central goal of the second phase of neofunctionalism appears to be the continuity of a reconstruction of the Parsonian legacy and to construct a new theory that focus more on social action that is informed by symbolic interactionism, exchange theory and ethnomethodology (Alexander and Colomy, 1990). Alexander believes that contingency within the action framework of Parsons to be a vitally missing element in his theory. Also, he adds insights from Marx on the salience of a materialist dimension of social action.
In this phase, Alexander and Colomy (1990) review a wide variety of researchers who have used neofunctionalist insights including social change, cultural sociology, political sociology, mass communication, feminist projects, the professions and economic sociology.
What I refer to as "Neofunctionalism Plus" reflects the most recent contributions by Alexander (1998) and what I consider to be vital concepts and propositions that flesh out more fully the neofunctionalist perspective. He retains and extends a discussion on the three system model of Parsons and considers it to be a permanent contribution to sociology. In this text, Alexander presents an extended discussion of action (acknowledging but going beyond exchange theory, symbolic interactionism, and ethnomethodology) that situates it within patterned meanings (the cultural system), psychological needs of the person (the personality system) and the interactional and institutional exigencies (the social system, 1998: 211). Under the rubric of culture, Alexander includes poststructural insights from Mary Douglas, Clifford Geertz, and the sociologist, Michael Foucault. From the social system, he outlines civil society as the locus of importance by adding what he calls "societal communities" which mediate between the public civil society and the private world of citizens.
I would add a forth system of Parsons which he uses in his AGIL model, the organic physical system 1Parsons, 1975). Parsons says little about it and Alexander does not include it at all in his neofunctionalism. This is the biological system of the human person and recent research on sociobiology (see Troost and Filsinger, 1993) is vital to achieve a full systemic perspective. I will include a moral theory of the family as an extension of the importance that both Parsons (1951) and Alexander (1998) to morality.
The central concepts that emerge from this review that will be useful
for a translation to the family include: the action frame of reference,
the four systems, social action, social order, structure, and the continued
importance of function.
In several places, Alexander (1982 and 1988) argues for an important distinction between sociological discourse and sociological explanation. Sociological discourse refers to .... "modes of argument that are more consistently generalized and speculative than normal scientific discussion" (1988:80). In contrast, explanation is directed to empirical evidence, inductive and deductive logics, cause and effect relationships, correlations between variables and the methodologies used to verify proposed propositions and hypotheses. Sociological explanation seeks verification through prediction while discourse focuses on persuasion from .... "logical coherence, expansiveness of scope, interpretive insight, value relevance, rhetorical force, beauty, and texture of argument" (1988:80). In the sociological enterprise, however, they are not to be divorced from one another. Alexander (1988) illustrates the divorce of these two elements when he refers to scholarship in sociology that is either an over determination by theory and an under determination by fact. This indicates a theory that does not have a vital empirical referent and that other relevant empirical factors and not given credence.
Alexander (1982) specifies discourse into two primary presuppositions: action and order2 These terms capture a central concern in social thought that can be traced, at least, back to Thomas Hobbes (15881679): the relationship between subject and object that is formulated in problems of subjectivism verses objectivism and freedom versus constraint. If a scholar were to define human action in terms that are purely objective (as material or conditional), it would mean that social action must be thoroughly determined or constrained (termed determinism). On the other hand, if a sociologist conceives social action as primarily subjective, as ideal or normative, it would thus not be determined at all by the objective environment and the actor would be completely free and not constrained at all (termed voluntarism). The problem of social order indicates the problem of how individuals are arranged in nonrandom social patterns (1982:92). I shall first outline the conceptual scheme of social action and then, social order.
Views of social action that select either one of these alternative would be unidimensional but including both would be considered to be multidimensional. To achieve a multidimensional approach in sociology, both social action and social order are necessary presuppositional elements.
These terms are further specified into a framework of means and ends of social action. Means are conceived as most effectively addressing objective conditions in pursuit of specific goals or are related primarily to the conditional environment of action while goals are related to the ideal or the normative. To further conceive social action as multidimensional, it is vital that it is seen partially as voluntary and partially determined or means and ends viewed as making independent (italics added) contributions to a given social act (Alexander, 1982:65-67).
Further distinctions belong to the domain of sociological presuppositions. Social action can be viewed as ranging from rationality to nonrationality. Quoting from Habermas (1971:26 & 170), he describes rationality on the extreme end of a continuum as instrumental rationality: .... "the purposive-rational organization of means or adaptive behavior" and internal subjective knowledge is but .... "a mere instrument of an organism's adaptation to a changing environment" (Alexander, 1982:74). Social theories which accent this end of the continuum3are united in that they all conceive social action as exclusively guided by calculations of efficiency in the pursuit of general norms. The contents of the goal (for example, guiding norms) become irrelevant.
Alexander struggles with finding a term to indicate the opposite end of the social action continuum and decides to use the term "nonrationality4" Goals of an actor are conceived as not only being sought after because of the most efficient means but, rather, because of the substantive ideal contents of the norms. This perspective emphasizes the subjective element of the social actor and the commitment to freedom.
The importance of social order is also elaborated upon by Alexander. Its continuum ranges from individualist to collectivist. The former refers to acknowledging the presence of external social structures but that these patterns are the result of individual negotiation. Structures and not merely carried by individuals but that it is individuals who produce them. On the other hand, collectivists argue that social patterns exist prior to any specific social act. At the extreme end, this position pushes the individual in the direction of preexisting structure and radically inhibits free choice or greatly reduces its range of possibilities (Alexander, 1988:84-85).
In the history of social theory, the individualist approach is best represented by the utilitarianism of the 19th century and the more recent work of Irving Goffman. The collectivist orientation is illustrated by Marxism and Neo-Marxism and can be termed either "materialism" or "sociological materialism" (Alexander, 1982:94-103). A good example of a multidimensional approach that recognizes the importance of both is the work of Peter Berger (1963).
This framework is illustrated by Figure 2 that is adapted and modified from Ritzer (1996:499):
These presuppositions are critical in this project. They will be used to evaluate the status of the theory created here to judge if it is multidimensional or not. I shall now continue by investigating the work of Parsons.
The goal of this paper is to utilize the best of Parsons and the neofunctionalist extension to create a synthetic conceptual framework of the family. I shall address some of the reasons why Parsons is in such poor repute in sociological circles and consider why his contributions have not been acknowledged in family theory. Thereafter, I shall outline his action frame of reference and his four system analysis. I shall then present his sociological theory of the family that is founded not so much from his essay with Bales (Parsons and Bales, 1955) but from his central work, The Social System. I shall not look at the critiques of Parsons here but will do so in the tracing of the development of neofunctionalism through the eyes of Alexander. I may be accused of using only such a small amount of the Parson opus. I do this only because this is a genesis work and if the project produces some credibility in family theory, I shall then look at extending the discussion to review the wider publications of this scholar.
Why not Parsons?
In two works, Alexander (1983 & 1990, with Colomy) traces some of the reaction to Parsons' sociology. His work formed the basis of much of the theory construction in America and
Europe from the middle of the 1960s until the 1980s. Conflict, critical, exchange, symbolic Interactionism, feminism and ethnomethodology commence much of their thinking as a reaction against the Harvard professor. Alexander writes:
On the most generalized level, it is not an exaggeration to observe
that over the last forty years major theoretical debate in Western sociology
has been mediated through Parsons' theories; further, every major theoretical
innovation-exchange theory, ethnomethodology, conflict theory, even certain
forms of revisionist Marxism-has been initiated through a reinterpretation
of one segment or another of Parsons' theoretical corpus....On a more specific
level, controversy within the most of the principal empirical subfields
of sociology has, at one point or another, focused on a particular set
of "Parsonian" propositions, whether or not such alleged configurations
accurately represented Parsons' own thinking. (1983:3).
Alexander continues by noting that there have been different directions in the United States (and I would add in Canada) and Europe. Theories in America have emerged out of a substantial critique of Parsons while in Europe, many sociologists have extended the insight of the scholar5 Alexander sees a pattern that may also be a vision of the future: the dialectic of acceptance, critique, revision, and assimilation. Nonetheless, if one stands in opposition to Parsons or with him, there is a basis for Goulder's (1970) observation that he is still the intellectual anchor of academic theory in sociology in the modern world (cited by Alexander, 1983:3).
The most important legacy of Parsons, Alexander contends, is how well he commences with a multidimensional perspective in sociology and how well he continues it. In addition, much of his positive legacy will be formulated in neofunctionalism to be followed after the outline of Parsons' systemic sociology and his sociology of the family.
Parson's Action Frame of Reference and the Four Systems.
I have selected to use one of the most important publications of Parsons to outline because it contextualizes his sociology of the family in the wider framework. His sociology of the family is not a mere investigation of substantive interest but, rather, forms a basis for his whole systemic theory. I will begin with outlining his action frame of reference and his systems theory.
Action Frame of Reference. In the most simplistic way, the frame of reference refers to
the orientation of one or more actors to a situation. This scheme is a relational one that consists of the relation of a social actor (or actors) to three kinds of objects within the situation: social, physical and cultural. A social object is termed an alter or a collective while the actor, an ego. The important difference between a social object and a physical object is that the former interacts or responds to the ego while the latter does not. Cultural objects are symbolic or value patterns. Action is social action which is a process in the actor-situation system which has motivational significance for the ego, or, in the case of collective, its component individuals. This forms an elementary social system which Parsons' defines as: ".... a plurality of individual actors interacting with each other in a situation which has a least a physical or environmental aspect, actors who are motivated in terms of the tendency to the 'optimization of gratification' and whose relation to their situations, including each other, is defined and mediated in terms of a system of culturally structured and shared symbols" (Parsons, 1951:5-6).
The system is further elucidated by viewing it from the ego's (to become, later, Parsons' personality system) perspective. As from above, the ego is orientated to the situation. This orientation takes on three forms: cognitive, cathectic (meaning to invest emotion or feeling in an idea, object, or another person), and evaluative. Cognitive is mental in nature wherein the ego defines the relevant aspects of the situation in their relevance to the interests of the ego. Cathectic refers to the significance of ego's relation to the objects within the situation for the gratification-deprivation balance of his or her personality. Cognitive and cathectic orientation do not stand alone. There needs to be a way for ego to decide on which object to select for gratification and which have meaning for him or her. Thus, there is also an evaluative aspect of concrete action orientation. From Greek and Medieval psychology, the cathectic seems to correspond to human desire, cognitive to thought or mind, and evaluation to the will or decision.
In his chapter on structural components of the social system (1951:50), Parsons extends his discussion of the cathectic, cognitive, and evaluative to be expressive, instrumental and moral types of action orientation. These terms will come to be central to the Parsonian heritage and have been accepted (specifically the instrumental-expressive) into mainstream sociology.
In his version of the social system, the motivational aspect of the ego to culture is central. He calls this orientation a "value-orientation." It is beyond the cathectic and refers to the content of the selective standards themselves within the cultural object of the system.
Parsons' action frame of reference really is his social system of which the personality (ego) system and the cultural system are embedded within it. I shall summarize his extension of these three systems.
The Social System. In his discussion of the social system, Parsons devotes a considerable amount of time explaining the types of action-orientation: instrumental, expressive and moral. Instrumental is similar to what Alexander calls rational and emerges from the classical economic tradition. The analogy is economic exchange where the alter's action is a means to the attainment of the ego's goal (or vice versa). The means to attain the goal, however, is not just influenced by the alter but also by the regulation of the interaction of the terms of exchange. The most common form of exchange within economics is the exchange of a commodity that one either gives up a possession or receives one. The exchange need not be only competition but also cooperation among actors. Cultural definitions (including laws) are central to the exchange that includes both access and restraint to commodities. These cultural definitions provide for roles and lead to what may be termed an "institutional complex."
One may view, then, that Parsons' focus is not so much on the actor but the role the actor plays in the interchange. More will be said on this in a critique of Parsons.
Expressive action is not orientated to the attainment of a goal outside of the immediate situation but towards an object (physical, social or cultural) to satisfy a needs-disposition of the affective nature. A link to a person that is purely cathectic becomes an object of attachments. If one becomes attached to a social group (a family, religion, nation), it becomes defined as loyalty.
The third type of action orientation is termed the moral6 This term is a nexus term that establishes patterns of order both within the instrumental and expressive types of action and between them. This is where his value-orientations come into place. Each of these value-orientations7 provide standards of conduct for the ego in his or her situation of interaction between physical and social objects. These pattern variables define role-expectations or rights and obligations vis-a-vis others and, thus, the structuring of sanctions for behavior.
A final pair of concepts in the discussion of the social system are solidarity and integration. For social action not to be random and chaotic in a social system, there appears to be the need for solidarity and integration. The third value orientation (see endnote 6), self-orientation/collectivity-orientation, serves this function. In order for a social system to function well, there needs to be present, at least, a minimal amount of collective orientation. It is here were a social system becomes integrated. It appears, however, to go beyond this one pair set to include the whole system of morality. To the level, then, that actors adhere to the common moral standards of a society, the better will be the integration between the same actors.
The Personality System. The personality system is the second system that he discusses. I shall discuss this under the rubric of the sociology of the family. He says more about this system under the titles of "Basic Personality Structure" and "The Situational Role-Specification of Orientations." These sections are not being addressed here as they have less relevancy to a sociology of the family.
The Cultural System. Culture forms another vital aspect in the scholar's social system
schemata. He defines it as: ".... patterned or ordered systems of symbols which are objects of the orientation of action, internationalized components of the personalities or individual actors and institutionalized patterns of social systems" (Parsons, 1951:327). In the light of the action orientation schemata, he divides his analysis of culture into three categories: beliefs systems, expressive symbols, and value orientation. They, are linked to his action orientations. Cognitive orientations are lined to belief systems, cathectic to expressive systems and evaluative, to value orientations. He had already discussed value orientations in his look at social systems. Under the title the cultural system, he investigates belief systems and expressive symbols.
Belief systems are subdivided into empirical and non-empirical. The former indicates beliefs relevant to direct observation, day to day interactions, and the subject matter of science. The non-empirical are those which have supernatural dimension and are not subject to empirical knowledge. Empirical beliefs (really, ideas) inform interactions with physical, social and cultural objects. The most relevant empirical beliefs are social ideologies which are systems of beliefs held in common by members of a collectivity (a world view but not Parsons' term). The primary function of empirical beliefs is communication while the basic function of the non-empirical is the problem of meaning to life. These belief systems undergird value orientations which, in turn, impact how social actors select means of action toward a goal.
As indicated above, expressive symbols are linked to expressive action and are defined as: .... "the symbol-systems through which expressive action is oriented to the situation" (Parsons, 1951:385). Like the rest of culture, it has a normative aspect. In addition, expressive symbolism is that part of the cultural tradition most directly integrated with the cathectic interests of the social actor. These symbols are necessarily interactive and must have significance for both the ego and the alter. And just as norms become internalized into a person (to be discussed under the sociology of the family), so also do expressive symbols become internalized. Some important kinds of symbols include clothes, the human body and works of art.
The Organic-Physical System. Parsons does not have a chapter in his The Social
System on this system. He develops it in later works. To recall, one of the object of orientation of the ego in the action frame of reference is the physical object. It is this object which becomes the focus of this fourth system. He goes further, however. The person is also a physical object. He finds the need, then, to hyphen this system into being also a organism one as well.
In addressing the evolutionary process of societies (Parsons, 1966), he specifies what he means by the organic-physical system. First of all it means the necessary link of the physical world to organic, human life by way of providing physical needs to the individual. The means to achieve this is through technological processes which, in turn, depend upon the cultural system. Technology is the primarily physical reference of the complex which includes the economy of a social system. This technology develops into a technological organization that is to be regarded as a boundary-structure between the society as a system and the organic-physical environment.
This is not the complete system, however. In his discussion of the relationship between sociology and the natural sciences (Parsons, 1951:541ff.), the other dimension of this is the physical aspect of the human actor him or herself. This is the place of biology. Biology (nature) both facilitates and imposes restrictions on human interactions. This is especially relevant to the question of the socialization of the child which will be discussed in the section of Parsons sociology of the family.
Parsons' Sociology of the Family. I return back to Parsons' discussion of the personality system where he investigates the role of the family in the action frame of reference. I do so because, as I said above, his insights here are central to his whole systemic approach to the study of society.
The child is the locus of discussion in his sociology of the family for it within the family as a social system that a person internalizes the patterns of value orientation, the culture (both cognitive and symbolic) of a society. Here the term function is especially relevant where the family is functionally defined as a critical socialization agent of individual actors. The mechanism of internationalization of value orientations is the level of attachment of an infant and a child to a (both) parent(s). Attachment to a care giver proceeds imitation and identification of the child to the cultural repertoire of a society.
Attachment is a result of adequate security of the infant and the child. This is the special role of the mother and is enhanced to the level of solidarity between the mother and the father. He uses the term "parental adequacy" (1951:221) to describe a parent who offers unconditional love to the infant and the child. To the level that this is not present, pathological results are likely.
Why is this attachment and identification with cultural values necessary? The primary reason Parsons gives is from the very nature, the biology of an infant and child. This is where he links his sociology of child development to the organic-physical system and what he calls a functional prerequisite of social systems. The human infant is physiologically dependent which, in turn, translates into emotional dependency. Supplying for the emotional needs of a child is an essential condition for social learning or the acquisition of value orientations for cultural competency (see Parsons, 1951: 32-33).
Besides the need for attachment, the father is important as a moral guide and acts as an agent of value orientation. In addition, the father acts as an encouragement to the child to lessen attachment bonds with the mother to learn how to develop relationships with non-kin persons. For Parsons, "parental adequacy" includes the presence of both the father and the mother and enables the child to first of all, become attached and then to acquire the values and norms of the cultural system.
This analysis indicates how vital is the family to Parsons' whole opus.
It is not just "another social system" but a social system that is at the
very core of his systemic perspective.
What I am typing as "neofunctionalism: phase one" is the period of time that Alexander (1985) refers to the period of a reconstruction of the Parsonian legacy. Alexander is ambiguous about the term "functionalism." Parsons himself did not like it and preferred to call his theoretical perspective, action theory. However, functionalism is the term that has "stuck" and Alexander continues to use the term with the prefix "neo."
The kind of functionalism that Alexander and some of his colleagues develop is multidimensional in the way he defined it earlier. In other words, it gives equal weight to both social action and social order along with each of their dimensions.
It is to be seen not so much as a theory but as a tradition or a broad intellectual tendency on the level of sociological discourse. It provides a general picture of the interaction of social parts, is a descriptive sense and not in an explanatory sense. A special legacy of Parsons is maintained: that of system.
In this way Alexander supercedes Parsons in that Parsons' failed to carry out his life long project of being multidimensional. Alexander critiques Parsons when the latter referred to himself as a "cultural determinist" (Alexander, 1983:212). In doing so, he reduces social action from freedom to constraint or from rational to nonrational (or idealist) and determinism. Alexander's goal in the construction of neofunctionalism is to give parity to both the rational and the nonrational (see figure 2, above).
Parsons seemed to consider integration of a social system as a fact while Alexander appraises it to be a possibility. The social system of Alexander is a dynamic system that changes and is moved from a variety of sources--not just from the cultural system. Indeed, material factors from the physical environment are also source of integration and non-integration.
The three systems of Parsons are vital to any theory of society. Alexander intends to retain them in his neofunctionalism. Interestedly, he does not include the organic-physical system which I intend to include in what I term "Neofunctionalism Plus." Parsons differentiation processes as a major mode of social change is retained but is balanced by Alexander and Colomy (1990) insights to be discussed in Neofunctionalism: Phase Two.
Alexander writes of an extraordinary revival of Parsons in Germany and could also be typed in a neofunctionalist vein. Another promising feature is that neofunctionalism creates links to other theories, especially conflict and interactionist theories and is sensitive to ideological (as being too conservative, for example) contents of the perspective.
Alexander and Colomy (1990) augment the basics present in phase one of the theoretical movement. They are cognizant of critiques that they are only attempting to resuscitate an older orthodoxy of Parsons. They consider themselves to be more than revisionists but are adding new insights to Parsons that flesh out Parsons beyond what he would have been able to do during his lifetime.
The goals of neofunctionalism are to move to a general discourse, to interpret the classics, to increase the scope of research programs, to relate it to other theoretical discourses, and to provide a framework for research projects. Several needs appear to be present is sociological discourse that neofunctionalism may provide an answer for. Much of the discourse from the middle of the 1960s to the 1990s has been a dichotomy between the micro and the macro and the divorce of the person from social structure8.
Referring back to Alexander's extensive analysis of Parsons (1983), Alexander and Colomy (1990) attempt to focus on the core tradition of Parson's that represented his earlier writings which appear to be much more ecumenical and multidimensional. They write: "Neofunctionalism can be distinguished from functionalism by its effort to reconstruct the core of the Parsonian tradition" (Alexander and Colomy, 1990:46).
This reconstruction, in part, needs to take into account contingency that was lost in the later Parsons. Here the authors say that the insights from Mead, Peirce, Goffman and the phenomenological schools will be very useful in accenting contingency within the social actor9.
Neofunctionalism is more than a sociological discourse. It is also useful it seeking to explain particular facets of the social world. Alexander and Colomy (1990) review a wide range of research literature that uses a neofunctionalist perspective: on social change, culture, politics, mass communications, feminism, professions, and economy. I find it interesting that family studies are not included in this litany. It has also contributed to the critique of Parsons who considered differentiation as a master narrative and trend. Contingency is also involved and differentiation should not be taken for granted just as the vision of modernity as being a continuous progression is to questioned.
According to an editor of a series of texts on twentieth-century social theory, Lemert (1998), Alexander brings to a close his more than twenty year project of running against the stream of North American social theory in reconstructing Parsons and introducing neofunctionalism as a viable theoretical position. He says so because Alexander (1998) himself notes that Parsons' contributions are now accepted as unquestionably important even though his actual theories are not longer acceptable. In addition, neofunctionalism has succeeded in helping to establish Parsons as a classical figure. As noted in the previous section, however, Alexander is not trying to place Parsons in social theory in the latter part of the 20th century carte blanche but to recognize and use his central systemic approach to the study of modernity. Part of this placement is to critique Parsons work, to acknowledge his myopia, and to go beyond and build on his positive legacy.
In an analysis of a posthumous publication of Parsons (1990), Alexander (1998) challenges those who consider Parsons to have a mechanistic approach to the relationship between system and function and the position that he was but a idealist sociologist. On a more positive note, Alexander (with Colomy) resurrects what he observed earlier (1990) the importance that Parsons gives to the morality of human action. He sees a profound moralism at the heart of the Parsonian corpus. Moral principles are reference points for human action. He writes: "I find this emphasis on the centrality of morality, and the respect for human dignity that this emphasis implies, extremely refreshing. It is also, in my opinion, a more accurate description of the empirical world" (1998:153). I shall return to this in the application of neofunctionalism to the family.
Another legacy of Parsons from this document is the multidimensional approach that Parsons give to social action: of the balance between rationality and nonrationality. Rationality (as argued above) is only one way social actors select certain means to achieve an end. They also rely on norms, values and mores to make these selections. Alexander creates a table with cells to illustrate this view of social action.
In his last chapter of his text, Alexander (1998) offers a "plus" to Parsons and an extension of neofunctionalism. Two contributions are to be outlined here because they are directly relevant to the application of the perspective to the family: his discussion on social action and culture.
In his discussion on action, Alexander makes important distinctions. Actors are those persons who act, agency refers to human freedom or free will and agents defines those actors who exercise free will. Action is the exercise of agency by persons. However, actors live in a cultural system which surrounds them. Thus, every action contains a dimension of free will or agency but not complete agency. Further, in the relationship between structures and actors, structures can be described as existing outside of actors only if one focuses on the social system.
All micro theories are defined as such because they do focus upon the actor. They have a common baseline, though, and are considered to be rational (rational choice or exchange), knowledgeable, reflexive, self-monitoring and competent (ethnomethodology) and creative, expressive and meaning-making (symbolic Interactionism). These images map a heroic view of the social actor but we have an abundance of evidence to show that actors are also cruel, passive, defensive, vicious, and self-deceptive. This part of the social actor needs to be present in an outline of the topic and is especially relevant when discussing divorce and family violence.
Much work has been done recently on the sociology of culture. With Parsons, a three-fold division of society permits an interpretation that culture is a relatively autonomous structure that informs social action and organization. Yet Parsons preceded what Wuthnow (1987) calls the cultural analytic approach which focuses on the vitality of the symbol and meaning. In an hermeneutic vein, an addition to Parsons allows one to link social action to the meaning that actors put to their social action. Actors are engaged in indexicality (to use Garfinkel's term) and are not mere conformists to cultural patterns but are involved in creating the same.
This completes my discussion on "neofunctionalism plus" but, of course, is not exhaustive. Alexander has much more to say about the new theoretical perspective in his continued debate with Parsons. Suffice it to say, that the contents here can be made significantly useful for neofunctionalist perspective of the family.
The permanent legacy of Parsons to be retained in constructing a neofunctionalist perspective on the family includes his action frame of reference, the functional role of the family to the larger social system and the four level systems approach linked to contributions from other theories. Additions to this legacy from neofunctionalism and the author's insights will round of this perspective. The additions include the importance of agency, the need for a multidimensional approach, the extension of morality applicable for the family, and an update on the forth system of Parsons, the organic physical with recent sociobiological perspectives.
The Action Frame of Reference.
The family member and the family can be seen to be the "actor" in the situation wherein he or she (or the family itself) is orientated towards physical, social or cultural objects. For an illustration, I shall begin with the ego who is a mother and the family unit itself as a social system. Using this frame of reference, she is especially orientated to her husband, common law partner, children and kin. She is orientated to them from an expressive, instrumental and moral type of social action. From an expressive orientation, she would be characterized as being loving, nurturing as well as being angry and spiteful. Her expressive impact would have a greater result with her children because of their dependency upon her for their emotional and physical needs. Because her partner would be another adult, the impact would be still important because adult alter would be more likely to resist her anger and control. Her instrumental impact would be her economic contribution to the family unit, her housework, her mundane (beyond expressive) care of children and the like. The moral orientation (to cultural objects) consists of the expectations from the culture that she be nurturing, non violent, committed to her partner, and responsible for the physical needs of her children.
If one sees the family as a social group, a collective in Parsons terms, the family as a social system is part of the wider social system. Herein, the family is also orientated to physical, social and culture objects. In this case, the physical would refer to the natural environment and the social system that mediates the physical, the economy. This system of interaction focuses on the instrumental orientation. In relationship to other social objects, these would be other social systems like the school, the polity and religion. The culture would refer to the culture that consists of cognitive and symbolic elements and is captured by such institutions as the media, nationalism, ethnicity and race. The family would relate to the culture using a cognitive, symbolic (expressive) and moral orientation (as to the norms and beliefs of a social system).
The Functional Role of the Family.
Sociology of the family in general and Parsons in particular see that the family is functional to the larger society. Parsons uses the term "parental adequacy" to refer to the kind of parenting that contributes both to the social and cultural development of a child. He makes an important point that the latter cannot happen well without the latter. A good question to ask her is the question of family structure: does family structure matter in the adequate socialization of children? How well are parents doing in this vital function? As was argued above, Parsons considers that both the father and the mother are necessary for the social and cultural development of the child. Evidence, although controversial, for the vital presence of the father and the mother emerges from a review of the literature on father absence and the need to institutionalize marriage again comes from the work of Popenoe (1996). I am not here to debate the validity of his review but to say that his work could very well be a wake up call for family scholars to seriously look at family structure again.
The Four Level Systems Approach and Linkages to other Theories.
As argued in the beginning of this paper, the four level systems approach is embedded in Parsons' action frame of reference. These levels are useful for a sociology of the family and provide a hinge, a framework to link to a wide variety of family theories that are multi disciplinary as well. I shall only discuss the first three systems and dedicate a section to the forth, the organic physical system.
Considering the family as a social system is useful in considering the family as a system of interacting persons. One could fit well the following insights and perspectives from the following theories: symbolic interactionism, family systems, family development, social conflict theories, and exchange theories (especially in viewing the ego within the family as a rational actor). The cultural system (both within and outside of the family) provides the framework for ecological developmental models and human ecological theories and feminism. The personality system lends itself to the life course perspective, social and cognitive behavioral psychology, phenomenology and ethnomethodology.
To do justice to these linkages is way beyond the scope of this paper
but it could be seen as a much wider project of the level of a book. This
is something the author may do.
The Importance of Agency
At the center of any family theory is the place of the person, the social actor. Neofunctionist perspectives on this are useful for a sociology of the family. The ego within a family is to be considered to be a person who is one who has agency, one who acts freely but is yet influenced by others and is informed from without. The question of gender is an illustration of this insight. A wide range of research on gender informs us that gender socialization consists of the beliefs of a culture (for example, patriarchy) and the codes of behavior (scripts) as to what is to be considered masculine and feminine are mediated through the family. In the case of childhood, the girl or the boy is less likely to freely choice which of these beliefs and codes are to become part of her or his personal identity. In adulthood the ego is more likely to exercise free choice and to define for themselves what is masculine and feminine.
As noted by Alexander above, humans are not only reflective, rational, self-monitoring and competent but can be also irrational, vicious, spiteful and the like. Micro conflict theory is a potential contributor in this understanding of family conflict. The psychological theories of family violence are also useful in informing us why family members are like that (see O'Leary, 1993).
Parsons own work on the family can also make a contribution. As above,
the care giver, to be an adequate parent, needs to unconditionally love
his or her child. This is the source of social competency that is more
likely to result in cultural competency.
A Multidimensional Approach
The neofunctionalist conceptual framework that I am proposing is multidimensional. On the level of social action, both rationalist and nonrationalist ends of a continuum are included (see figure 2). Family members use a rational form of social action but not exclusively (as in exchange theory). They also refer to norms and morality is such issues as care, responsibility, norms that inform care givers to provide for the emotional and physical needs of a child (what Parsons calls need-dispositions).
On the continuum of social order, families are both created by individual members (as in the case of symbolic interactionism) but are also formed by cultural and social structures, particularly the economy. Studies on the history of the family provide much evidence that families adapt to differing economic conditions but do so not in a merely passive way (see Hareven [1987] in her use of the term "family strategies").
Another measure of multi dimensionality is that of the necessary inclusion of all four systems in an analysis of the family: the social, the cultural, the personal, the organic, and the physical environment. When in order, parity should be given to influences from (and influences to) all four.
The Place of Morality
As indicated above, Alexander considers that Parsons' inclusion of morality as being very important to a theory of society. I would like to specify this with my own work on a moral theory of the family (Swenson, 1995) along with Knapp and Thomas' (1997) contributions.
Swenson (1995) uses a philosopher named Levinas (1969 and 1987) to structure a moral theory of the family. I will reflect on the how this may be considered to be a moral basis of family processes.
Not only does Levinas consider Being-for-the Other10 to be at the very heart of human relationships and human societies but he considers it to be the very centre of familial relationships. He uses the following terms to describe how this occurs within families: Eros, filiality and fraternity11. By Eros, he (1969:256) means the more familiar term, love. Love aims at the Other in frailty. To love is to fear for the other and to come to her or him in assistance. It is in frailty, in mutual vulnerability, that the loved one becomes the Beloved. The Beloved is characterized by tenderness. This is in opposition to sexual utilization of the other person which he refers to as voluptuosity and is a profanation of the other person (as in rape, pornography, violence against women and sexual abuse of children).
All humans come to be through a vehicle of maternal and paternal parenting. To be a child is to be, among other things, dependent on parents. They do not merely biologically produce their children but they also imprint themselves their children. Filiality means, then, procreation in the biological sense of the term but, more so, the responsibility of the parents to care for and nurture their children (1969:278). This is why child abuse (emotional, physical or sexual) is so much in opposition to what it means to be family; parents who abuse their children are reneging on an essential responsibility of being a family.
It is from this micro environment that fraternity ( and sorority, to be gender inclusive) takes on meaning. If parents really consider each other as Being-for-the Other and that they care for and protect their children so that they may become beings-for-others, then we have the foundation of fraternity and sorority in the human society. Levinas comments (1969:280):
The relation with the face in fraternity, where in his turn the Other appears in solidarity with all the others, constitutes the social order, the reference of every dialogue to the third party by which the We -or the parti-encompasses the face to face opposition, opens the erotic upon a social life, all signifyingness and decency, which encompasses the structure of the family itself. But the erotic and the family which articulate it ensure to this life, in which the I does not disappear but is promised and called to goodness, the infinite time of triumph without which goodness would be subjectivity and folly.
What can we say, then, about the moral basis of the family? First, families are not merely socially constructed as from agency. By this I do not mean they are not socially constructed at all but that they are founded on a morality that has a universalistic meaning, as well as being constructed by various persons in a wide variation of circumstance (culture, time and place). If we only have the social construction of morality within families, we have no basis to judge what is right and wrong when we meet such behaviours as family violence, infanticide, clitoral circumcision, and the parental selling of girls into prostitution.
Second, if the study of morality is, indeed, the foundation of philosophy and the essence of humanity consists in social relationships, then it follows that the essence of family is also in social relationships. More particularly, it is theorized that the heart of familial relationships is Being-for-the Other. This means parents being for each other, parents being for their children, and children (especially as adults) being for one another.
What Levinas does not discuss, however, is that people and families live in human societies which are not even close to being reflective of Being-for-the Other. Many persons live in very socially toxic environments (to use Garbarino's term). Many persons are imprisoned in poverty, despair, unhealthy relationships, discrimination, and injustice. I would argue that the need for this kind of ethic is even more imperative in this context. Persons imprisoned in what can be termed toxic waste lands are very fragile and vulnerable. Persons who have been the recipients of Being-for-the Other are responsible to transfer this gift to those in these socially detrimental environments.
In sum, this image of morality goes beyond Parsons. In his Social System, he does not see morality beyond the social system as his vision does not include all various types of societies in space and time. However, because he does place morality at the core of his sociology, the work of Levinas is a natural extension.
The Organic- Physical System.
As noted above, this forth system is barely referred to in Parsons Social System and Alexander does not consider it to be at the core of the Parsonian oeuvre. Here, I will focus on the organic aspect of this system. Because of important work on biosocial perspectives on the family, I consider it to be an important system. Troost and Filsinger (1993) provide us with several assumptions. They can be summarized to mean that not only does culture and society influence social interaction and families as systems but so also does biology. The most clear example is sex. Gender (as a social construct) would not be possible without sex. Biologically, men impregnate and women conceive, gestate and lactate. A second set of observations that are relevant to the family is the nature of children. An infant and a child is altricial or is helpless at birth and requires parental care for a long period of time. This translates into a care giver who remains active in a child's life for a long period of time.
More recent research reverses the traditional arrow of influence or causality from nature to nurture to nurture to nature. Research documented from neurologists, neurobiologists, neurophysiologists, and pediatric neurologists presents credibility to the negative effects of child abuse. Time (1997) presents insights from this new empirical inquiry. These researchers show that because the human brain develops in sequence, if abuse occurs early in a child's life it has the effect of jeopardizing vital linkages between neurons. In addition, child neglect is also damaging. A psychologist monitored brain-wave patterns of children born to depressed mothers. These children showed markedly reduced brain activity in the left frontal lobe that is a centre for joy and other emotions. On the other hand, the research documented here also shows that the infant's brain grows and synapses are created to the level that an infant is loved and cared for. In other words, Parsons words sound loud and clear: social development proceeds cultural development.
This paper comes to conclusion but, I hope, the project will not. What I have endeavoured to do in this paper is to reconstruct functionalism under the rubric of neofunctionalism. I contend with Pittman (1993), as noted above, that it may be down but not out. I trust that this may be a genesis of a new look at the Parsonian heritage that has fallen into so much ill repute. I await my colleagues responses to see how well I have done with this introduction.
1. Sometimes called the behavioral system.
2. The term "social structures" is the term most commonly used by sociologists and it refers to patterns of society (Alexander, 1988:84).
3. Some such ones include Coleman (1990) and a journal dedicated to this theory, Rationality and Society.
4. Weber (1978:24-25) prefers to keep the term rationality and calls it "value-rationality" (or wertrational in contrast to instrumental rational or zweckrational) which is very close to Alexander's usage of the term.
5. For an elaboration of names, see Alexander (1983: 3-6).
6. This is very similar to Weber's "value-rationality" (wertrational).
7. He also calls these pattern variables that include five concept pairs: affectivity/affective neutrality; self-orientation/collectivity-orientation; universalism/particularism; achievement/ascription; and specificity/diffuseness. (Parsons, 1951:67).
8.Outside of neofunctionalism, Ritzer (1996) devotes a whole part of his work to the question of integration on the micro-macro aspects of social life and the question of agency versus integration.
9. Parsons seems to have left out contingency is his view of the social actor. The unit of action is but the person withing a role and not the person him or herself. Parsons writes: "The primary emphasis of this volume has been on the integration of social systems at the level of patterns of value-orientation as institutionalized in role-expectations" (1951:350).
10. Knapp and Thomas (1997) expand on this. Citing Bauman (1993:48), "morality is the encounter with the Other as Face." They see this that the Other defined as Face is the other that is irreplaceable, that cannot be substituted by another person because this person before me is unique. Levinas (1989) adds that she or he is not defined by or reduced to such categories as master statuses (as gender, age, marital status, ethnicity or class). Just because the other individual is a person is the call for the agent to be for him or her as a primary stand and not be there for one's own sake.
Linguis (1987), in an introduction to some papers of Levinas, writes (1987: XXIX).... "The concept of a face is the central moment of all of Levinas's phenomenology. In addition, everything is centered on the alterity of the alter ego. The self, becomes self in the relationship to the Other. In other words, the human person is not essentially a rational being as Aristotle would have it, but a social being whose very essence is in being social (but not societal which includes norms and social structures).
Levinas (1989) expands on this. The responsibility for the Other pre-exists any self-consciousness. This does not mean that the encounter is present but the responsibility for it is present. Further, the self does not grasp the Other in order to dominate but to care for the other. It is in the nature or response to the Face's epiphany. This is what he means by the terms infinity and totality. I am not total by myself and I move to infinity by responding to the richness and the gift of another person. He writes (1989: 83):
...the Face before me summons me, calls me, begs for me, as if the invisible
death that must be faced by the Other, pure otherness, separated in some
way, from any whole, were my business.
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